This article studies the determinants of international bargaining power in instances of trade negotiations between the European Union and the United States. The authors’ central hypothesis is that an appraisal of the US–EU trade relationship requires an understanding of the ways in which “domestic” political institutions shape the bargaining behavior of international actors. In particular, this article argues that the frequent EU “successes” in its negotiations with the US are the result of the bargaining power that its unique institutional arrangements grant its negotiators. In order to explain the distributional outcomes of international trade negotiations, the authors explore the “Schelling conjecture” and analyze why it is particularly relevant to the understanding of the unique bargaining power of EU negotiators when they are confronted with their American counterparts. To examine the explanatory power of domestic institutions in episodes of trade negotiations, the article analyzes the US-EC Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations (1986–1993).

Although the Member States of the European Union (EU) have long since relinquished their power to act as autonomous actors in international trade negotiations, they have now chosen to regain some of their lost trade sovereignty. Neither the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) 1994 opinion, nor the 1997 reform of the trade policy process at Amsterdam delegated full negotiating authority to the Commission over the 'new trade issues' of services and intellectual property. Instead, Member States settled on a hybrid form of decision-making to enable ad hoc rather than structural delegation of competence. Was this a rollback of EU competence? If so, why has it occurred in the EU's oldest and most successfully integrated, policy sector? A shift in the perceived trade-off between economic interests and ideological bias on the part of key Member States can explain such a change. This article also explores the consequences for the future conduct of the EU's trade policy and its influence in shaping the world political economy, as well as for the evolving pattern of federal allocation of jurisdiction in the EU.

Was the European Court of Justice a key actor in the "relaunching" of European integration in the 1980s? This article examines the crucial political role that was played by the Court with its Cassis de Dijon judgment in the rejuvenation EC harmonization policy and the development of the Single European Act. The authors challenge the dominant view that the Court's legal decisions in themselves create policy consequences, or that legal verdicts reflect the views of dominant member states, so as to create focal points around which a policy consensus emerges. They argue, instead, that the Cassis verdict acted as a catalyst, provoking a political response by the Commission, which attempted to capitalize on the verdict to create a "new approach to harmonization." This political entrepreneurship by the Commission triggered the mobilization of interest groups that lobbied their national governments for and against mutual recognition. Generalizing from the case, this article concludes that the Court performs three crucial roles in the EC policy-making process: opening political access to self-interested individuals, launching ideas into the policy-making arena, and provoking political responses through bold argumentation and unpopular verdicts.

The European Union (EU), for decades a pillar of openness and multilateralism, has recently shifted towards a more assertive commercial policy relying on the development of new geoeconomic instruments designed to level the playing field and deal with the increasing blurriness between economy and national security. Alongside the new EU FDI screening framework for national security in place since 2020, the EU recently proposed and adopted another FDI screening mechanism to tackle market distortions arising from foreign subsidies in the context of European mergers and acquisitions. Why is the EU introducing this new policy instrument right now? What political economy forces shape the institutional design? And why does this instrument enjoy broad support in the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament despite its likely redistributive impacts on Member State economies? Our paper uses process tracing, expert interviews, media research and secondary literature to trace the history of this policy project from its inception to its entry into force in mid 2023. In particular, we question why the decision was made to embed this policy under the competition arm of the European Commission, unlike FDI screening for national security which is managed by the trade policy arm. The paper finds that framing foreign subsidies as a competition issue sought to insulate the policy from accusations of disguised protectionism and ensured political support across the EU. Whereas more activist Member States, services of the European Commission and Members of the European Parliament see the instrument as a steppingstone toward a European industrial policy and more assertive foreign policy, vis-à-vis notably China, others perceive it as a long overdue measure to close regulatory gaps and to strengthen EU competition and state aid policy as well as relevant WTO rules. The paper contributes to the growing literature on EU foreign economic policy at the nexus between International Political Economy and Security Studies by shedding light on one of the most prominent new policy initiatives in these domains.

Although culture is not at the heart of the policy agenda of the current French administration, it will likely be affected by the Sarkozy revolution. French culture seems to be in a state of crisis, as evidenced both by the end of its ‘rayonnement’ outside of France and by its diminutive focus on the producers instead of the consumers of cultural goods. The options available for reform can, paradoxically given France’s history of policy opposition to American culture, be inspired by what is done in the United States, as is suggested by Fre´de´ ric Martel’s 2006 book De la Culture en Ame´rique. A reform of French cultural policy would have implications both for foreign and for domestic policies.

The European Union, the world's foremost trader, is not an easy bargainer to deal with. Its twenty-five member states have relinquished most of their sovereignty in trade to the supranational level, and in international commercial negotiations, such as those conducted under the World Trade Organization, the EU speaks with a "single voice." This single voice has enabled the Brussels-based institution to impact the distributional outcomes of international trade negotiations and shape the global political economy.

Trading Voices is the most comprehensive book about the politics of trade policy in the EU and the role of the EU as a central actor in international commercial negotiations. Sophie Meunier explores how this pooling of trade policy-making and external representation affects the EU's bargaining power in international trade talks. Using institutionalist analysis, she argues that its complex institutional procedures and multiple masters have, more often than once, forced its trade partners to give in to an EU speaking with a single voice.

Through analysis of four transatlantic commercial negotiations over agriculture, public procurement, and civil aviation, Trading Voices explores the politics of international trade bargaining. It also addresses the salient political question of whether negotiating efficiency comes at the expense of democratic legitimacy. Finally, this book looks at how the EU, with its recent enlargement and proposed Constitution, might become an even more formidable rival to the United States in shaping globalization.

The French Challenge deals with France's effort to adapt to globalization and its consequences for France's economy, cultural identity, domestic politics, and foreign relations. The authors begin by analyzing the structural transformation of the French economy, driven first by liberalization within the European Union and more recently by globalization. By examining a wide variety of possible measures of globalization and liberalization, the authors conclude that the French economy's adaptation has been far reaching and largely successful, even if French leaders prefer to downplay the extent of these changes in response to political pressures and public opinion. They call this adaptation "globalization by stealth."

The authors also examine the relationship between trade, culture, and identity and explain why globalization has rendered the three inseparable. They show how globalization is contributing to the restructuring of the traditional French political spectrum and blurring the traditional differences between left and right. Finally, they explore France's effort to tame globalization—maîtriser la mondialisation—and the possible consequences and lessons of the French stance for the rest of the world.

Resistance to change seems to be a deeply ingrained trait of French national character, and therefore traditional political accounts of France emphasize historical continuity. Yet, France has changed considerably in the past two decades, whether in economic, social, or political terms. This article reviews Changing France: The Politics That Markets Make and, beyond this book, asks how France has and has not been transformed. The central argument is that this change has taken place for the most part in the shadows instead of being publicized and debated. This has led to an overwhelming feeling of malaise in society and to a crisis of political representation.