This research note investigates the causes of the 2024–2026 reform of the European Union’s investment screening framework by probing two competing explanations: “failing forward” and “muddling through.” We show that Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was a lowest-common-denominator outcome whose design gaps were apparent from adoption. We compare the two explanations along three dimensions on which they generate divergent expectations: the nature of the crisis catalyst; institutional lock-in; and the seeds of the next failure embedded in the new framework. Reading Regulation (EU) 2026/1386, adopted on 17 June 2026, against these dimensions, we argue that the reform is better characterised as muddling through than failing forward. It was triggered by a mandated statutory review and exogenous geopolitical shocks rather than by an endogenous governance crisis, and it reproduces the core sovereignty constraint of 2019, with the Commission obtaining no override powers. We discuss the implications for economic security governance more broadly.